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I.

INTRODUCTION

Copyright and education have a long, albeit somewhat
troubled, history together, dating back to the first American
copyright law.1 Long before its inception, the Copyright Act
of 1976 generated debate between copyright owners and
educators regarding the extent of their privileges and rights
under the new law. In hearings before House and Senate
subcommittees on the 1976 Bill, educational and scholarly
uses of copyright received more attention than any other
topic.2
While copyright owners have very rarely sued
educators,3 the boundaries of educational privileges under
the current Copyright Act, including the limits of fair use,
remain highly contentious. Representatives of educational
interests decry the perceived contraction of privileged uses
of copyrighted materials for educational purposes,
particularly those granted by fair use4 and specific teaching
exceptions to the public-performance rights of owners.5
Copyright owners, meanwhile, adamantly argue that such
contraction ultimately produces more, and better,
copyrighted material, and that increased damages—
particularly statutory damages—are necessary to maintain
*

© 2008 L. Ashley Aull.
* J.D., magna cum laude, Harvard Law School, 2007.
Briefing
Attorney to Justice Harriet O’Neill of the Supreme Court of Texas.
1
. See, e.g., THE PAT. OFF. SOC’Y , Proceedings in Congress During the
Years 1789 and 1790, Relating to the First Patent and Copyright Laws, 22 J.
PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 243, 277–282 (1940) (following the passage of the first
copyright act in 1790: a bill “for the encouragement of learning, by
securing the copies of maps, charts, books and other writings, to the
authors and proprietors of such copies”).
2
. Ann W. MacLean, Education and Copyright Law: An Analysis of the
Amended Copyright Revision Bill and Proposals for Statutory Licensing and
a Clearinghouse System, 56 VA. L. REV. 664, 664–65 n.5 (1970).
3
. But see Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1983); Wihtol v.
Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962); Encyclopedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v.
Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
4
. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
5
. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(1)–(2) (2000).
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their incentives to create.6
Scarcity of case law fuels the educational debate, as no
solid precedent provides an absolute foothold for either
producers or educational users. Most high-profile cases on
educational use involve fair use, which provides notoriously
uncertain immunity to users of copyrighted works. Other
sections of the Copyright Act, also explicit in their favoritism
of teaching practices, suffer from few precise case
applications. Sections 110(1) and 110(2) of the Copyright
Act provide clear, albeit qualified, exceptions to the public
performance rights of copyright owners for classroom
teaching and distance education,7 but have produced no
reported cases defining their boundaries. Similarly, very few
cases apply § 504(c), which significantly discounts—or
eliminates—statutory
damages
using
criteria
that
educational use would commonly satisfy.8
While courts have had only limited opportunities to
address the propriety of individual educators’ teaching
practices,9 it is clear that academics do not enjoy complete
immunity from liability: use of copyrighted materials by
preparers of study guides,10 biographers,11 and other
6

. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2000). See also H.R. REP. No. 106-216, at 6
(1999) (noting, in support of the Copyright Damages Improvement Act of
1999, that “Courts and juries must be able to render awards that deter
others from infringing intellectual property rights. It is important that the
cost of infringement substantially exceed the costs of compliance. . . .”).
7
. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(1)–(2).
8
. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).
9
. But see Wihtol, 309 F.2d at 777 (denying fair use defense to
individual school teacher who created unauthorized rearrangement of a
choral piece, in order to make it suitable for school choirs); MacMillan Co. v.
King, 223 F. 862, 867–68 (D. Mass. 1914) (denying fair use defense to
individual tutor who developed summaries and study guides based on
popular economics textbook); Marcus, 695 F.2d at 1172 (finding public
school teacher liable for incorporating substantial portion of another
teacher’s copyrighted cake-decorating book into her own book).
10
. See, e.g., Educ. Testing Servs. v. Simon, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (C.D.
Cal. 1999) (denying fair use defense—in large part based on special status
of secure tests—to for-profit tutor who copied test questions for study
guides); Addison-Wesley Publ’g Co. v. Brown, 223 F. Supp. 219, 225
(E.D.N.Y. 1963) (defendants found liable for publishing and selling solutions
manual to popular physics textbook); MacMillan, 223 F. at 862.
11
. See, e.g., Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068–72 (2d Cir. 1977)
(reversing order of summary judgment on issue of fair use and remanding
for consideration of whether defendant’s incorporation of copyrighted
letters in a biography would diminish market for the owners’ own
publication of the letters); Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 736–
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teachers and scholarly authors have all resulted in findings
of infringement.
Additionally, owners have used civil
litigation to challenge the propriety of decreasingly
expensive,
and
increasingly
accessible,
copying
technologies, targeting large-scale institutional copying of
journals and other scholarly materials for use in research
and teaching.12
Particularly in suits against teaching
institutions, infringement findings significantly impact actual
practice.13
Thus, educational copyright debates take place in an
am-biguous field of law. Unfortunately, they also use a
vocabulary ill-suited for progress or agreement: one
characterized by polarized rhetoric and misconceptions of
education’s true status under the Copyright Act.14 This
paper seeks to address and amend this unproductive
42 (2d Cir. 1991) (determining that use of copyrighted letters of Richard
Wright in a scholarly biography was fair use); Maxtone-Graham v.
Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1260–65 (2d Cir. 1986) (determining that use of
copyrighted interviews taken from predominantly pro-choice compilation of
experience with pregnancy by author of pro-life book was fair use); Kraft v.
Kobler, 667 F. Supp. 120, 126–29 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (rejecting fair-use
defense of author who incorporated substantial portions of copyrighted
letters into a biography of composer Stravinsky).
12
. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Doc. Servs., 99 F.3d
1381, 1393 (6th Cir. 1996) (rejecting fair-use defense of for-profit copy
shop that openly advertised that it refused to pay licensing fees for copied
portions of articles used in university course-packs); Am. Geophysical
Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 931 (2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting fair-use
defense of commercial employer of research scientists that had
photocopied subscription journals by use of those in-house researchers);
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1362 (Ct. Cl. 1973),
aff’d, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (ruling that copying of journal articles by the
National Institute of Health and National Library of Medicine for large-scale
distribution to in-house research staff was fair use); Basic Books, Inc. v.
Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1529–37 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(rejecting fair-use defense of for-profit copy shop that failed to pay
licensing fees for articles copied for university course-packs); Encyclopedia
Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156, 1156 (W.D.N.Y. 1982)
(rejecting fair-use defense of school system that engaged in large-scale offthe-air taping and librarying of programs broadcast on public television).
13
. “After Kinko’s . . . many copy shops that had not previously
requested permission from copyright holders began to obtain such
permission.” Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1384. Concerns for such
impacts, however, sometimes motivate judges to avoid findings of
infringement. See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1356 (“There is no
doubt in our minds that medical science would be seriously hurt if such
library photocopying were stopped.”).
14
. See infra note 42 (discussing Paul Goldstein’s characterization of
copyright “optimists” and “pessimists”).
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vocabulary, by suggesting—somewhat heretically—that
educational use, including fair use, has a price.15 The paper
briefly reviews popular intuitions about educational freedom
and copyright, and the related vocabulary of “users’ rights”
and “balance” that permeates the educational-privilege
debate. At the end of the section, the paper proposes a
recharacterization of that “balance” as a price.
The
following section contends that fair use, educational
exceptions to the performance right, and statutory damages
as a system of cooperative boundaries establish a statutory
regime of price discrimination for copyrighted works,
defining and patrolling the boundary between “educational”
and “general” markets for copyright. Finally, the paper
addresses the types of private conduct that can impact the
“price” of educational use within this market.
In the
aggregate, this discussion seeks to direct the attention of
interested parties towards the real variables affecting the
cost and availability of copyrighted works for educators.

II. ON POPULAR INTUITIONS AND PESKY VOCABULARIES
A. A BRIEF HISTORY
COPYRIGHT

OF INTUITIONS

ABOUT EDUCATIONAL FREEDOM

AND

Educational users of copyrighted works enjoy a popular
presumption, and some statutory grant, of immunity from
liability for copyright infringement.
The intuition that
educational use of copyright should be free runs deep into
the foundations of American copyright law. The intuition is
articulated variously as a concern for free speech and
limiting authors’ power to control commentary, 16 a concern
for encouraging transfers that produce positive externalities
on society,17 a concern for fulfilling copyright’s Constitutional
15

. The pricing of all access to information has been characterized as
“informational tyranny” in the context of debates about licensing. See,
e.g., Carol M. Silberberg, Preserving Educational Fair Use in the TwentyFirst Century, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 617, 646 (2001).
16
. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s
Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 13 (2002).
17
. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
477–78 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as
Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case
and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1607 (1982). See also
Silberberg, supra note 15, at 623 (“In copyright, the public benefit from
distributing information is not typically included in an individual buyer’s
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purpose of promoting science and the useful arts,18 and a
concern for the preservation of long-accepted practices.19
Accordingly, several provisions of the current copyright act
grant privileges to educators, allowing them to use—at no
apparent cost—copyrighted works without the permission of
the owner: fair use,20 educational exceptions to performance
rights,21 and decreased statutory damages in the event of
infringement.22 However, anecdotal evidence suggests that
the popular presumption of immunity far exceeds actual
statutory authority for educators to freely copy protected
material.
Absent at least some immunity from the normal costs of
copyright-compliance,
educators
indeed
might
face
significant roadblocks. As stated by Justice Blackmun in his
Sony v. Universal Studios dissent:
There are situations . . . in which strict enforcement of [a copyright]
monopoly would inhibit the very “Progress of Science and useful
Arts” that copyright is intended to promote. An obvious example is
the researcher or scholar whose own work depends on the ability to
refer to and to quote the work of prior scholars. Obviously, no
valuation of a work. Although society greatly benefits from distributing the
work, the buyer is only willing to pay the value personally received.”).
18
. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See also Kenneth D. Crews, The Law of
Fair Use and the Illusion of Fair-Use Guidelines, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 606
(2001) (“[F]air use is . . . consistent with the constitutional objectives of
copyright in general: to promote the progress of science and the useful
arts. The framers of the U.S. Constitution clearly intended that the law of
copyright—including fair use—would be tailored to serve the advancement
of knowledge.”).
19
. The assertion that long-accepted practice makes such use legally
permissible, however, is doubtful. One of the principle cases relied upon
for support by academics wishing for broader privileges, Williams & Wilkins,
in fact involved a significant—and problematic—deference to practice. See
487 F.2d at 1350, 1353 (“These customary facts of copyright-life are
among our givens.”). The court in Williams & Wilkins took for granted that
a single hand-written copy made by an academic is a fair use when it noted
that it is “common for courts to be given photocopies of recent
developments, with the publishing company’s headnotes and arrangement,
and sometimes its annotations.”). Later cases have explicitly rejected this
reliance upon practice as proof of legal permissibility. See Sony, 464 U.S.
at 468 n.16 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is by no means clear that the
making of a ‘hand copy’ of an entire work is permissible; the most that can
be said is that there is no reported case on the subject, possibly because
no copyright owner ever thought it worthwhile to sue.”); Am. Geophysical
Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 924 (2d Cir. 1994) (such “argument
today is insubstantial”).
20
. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
21
. 17 U.S.C. § 110(1)-(2).
22
. 17 U.S.C. § 504.
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author could create a new work if he were first required to repeat
the research of every author who had gone before him. The
scholar, like the ordinary user, of course could be left to bargain
with each copyright owner for permission to quote from or refer to
prior works. But there is a crucial difference between the scholar
and the ordinary user. When the ordinary user decides that the
owner’s price is too high, and forgoes use of the work, only the
individual is the loser. When the scholar forgoes the use of a prior
work, not only does his own work suffer, but the public is deprived
of his contribution to knowledge. The scholar’s work, in other
words, produces external benefits from which everyone profits.23

As stated by another author: “[w]ithout paying someone
to teach you or buying a book that explains Newton’s laws,
you are not terribly likely to learn them merely because they
are in the public domain.”24
Nevertheless, the intuition that educators always
deserve special treatment may be more modern than many
scholars suspect—particularly those scholars who perceive a
significant erosion of user privileges over time.25 Although
the doctrine of fair use was born in the case of Folsom v.
Marsh in 1841, that very case denied its application to a
biographer’s use of George Washington’s letters. Justice
Story did not consider the academic status of the defendant
as a determinative factor in his analysis of infringement.
Rather, Justice Story held that fair use was unavailable to the
defendant—regardless of the defendant’s profession—“if the
value of the original is sensibly diminished or the labors of
the original author are substantially appropriated.”26
By 1914, when fair use had become well established in
the courts,27 teachers still did not necessarily receive special
23

. Sony, 464 U.S. at 477–78 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
. Michelle Boldrin & David Levine, Intellectual Property and the
Efficient Allocation of Social Surplus from Creation, 2 REV. ECON. RES. ON
COPYRIGHT ISSUES 45, 64 (2005). Boldrin and Levine, in fact, demonstrate that
given any circumstance in which such sources are independently licensed,
the likelihood of creation of a new work—or, say, a teaching program—
incorporating all such sources decreases to zero as the number of required
licenses increases. See id. at 61.
25
. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Professor of Law, Stanford Univ.,
Keynote Address from the Open Source Convention: Free Culture (July 24,
2002),
available
at
http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/policy/2002/08/15/lessig.html;
Siva
Vaidhyanathan, Copyright as Cudgel, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 2, 2002, at
B6 (citing James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism
for the Net? 47 DUKE L.J. 87 (1997)).
26
. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (D. Mass. 1841).
27
. See, e.g., West Publ’g Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 169 F. 833
24
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treatment under copyright law. In Macmillan Co. v. King,28
the District Court of Massachusetts considered an
infringement suit brought against an economics tutor who
prepared study sheets for his students, based on, and
quoting from, a popular economics textbook. Despite the
lack of any evidence showing economic harm to the
plaintiff,29 the Court found that the copying had “resulted in
an appropriation . . . of the author’s ideas and language
more extensive than the copyright law permits.” 30 The Court
explicitly rejected the suggestion that, as an educator, King
deserved special leeway:
I am unable to believe that the defendant’s use of the outlines is
any less the infringement because he is a teacher, because he uses
them in teaching the contents of the book, because he might
lecture upon the contents of the book without infringing, or
because his pupils might have taken their own notes of his lectures
without infringing.31

Thus, while the judge took for granted that certain
teaching practices using the book would have been noninfringing, teacher status itself made no difference.
Thus, although there is a strong popular presumption
that educators deserve special status in copyright law,
neither traditional nor modern copyright cases fully
recognize an educational-status-based exemption to
intellectual property rights.
This difference between
perceived and actual immunity creates significant
frustration, particularly when many educators perceive
licenses as prohibitively expensive or difficult to obtain.32
(E.D.N.Y. 1910), decree modified by 176 F. 833 (2d Cir. 1910) (considering
the fair use of excerpts from copyrighted case reports in a legal
encyclopedia); Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 61 (D. Mass 1869)
(“Examined as a question of strict law, apart from exceptional cases, the
privilege of fair use accorded to a subsequent writer must be such, and
such only, as will not cause substantial injury to the proprietor of the first
publication . . . .”). Some of the early cases apply fair use in a manner now
more akin to the rejection of copyright in the underlying facts of a work.
See, e.g., Dun v. Lumbermen’s Credit Ass’n, 144 F. 83 (7th Cir. 1906).
28
. MacMillan Co. v. King, 223 F. 862 (D. Mass. 1914).
29
. Id. at 867.
30
. Id. at 866.
31
. Id.
32
. See Kristine H. Hutchinson, The Teach Act: Copyright Law and
Online Education, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2204, 2215–16 nn.52–59 (2003)
(relaying interviews with various online educators frustrated by limitations
imposed by their inability to obtain licenses for educational use of
material); Carl Belz, Unwriting the Story of Rock in FAIR USE AND FREE INQUIRY:
COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE NEW MEDIA 36, 38 (John Shelton Lawrence & Bernard
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EDUCATION

The long history of the intuition that educators deserve
special treatment under copyright law has an attendant
vocabulary of educators’ “rights,” the use of which
contributes to further frustration in debates between
educational users and copyright-holders. With respect to
both
educational
uses
and
copyright
generally,
commentators utilize a flawed vocabulary to characterize
users’ and producers’ competing interests and respective
powers. Discussions of users’ “rights” employ a terminology
specifically intended to invigorate resistance to changes in
copyright law. However, the language of la résistance
mischaracterizes the educational users’ position and
conflicts with a dominant vocabulary of producers’ rights, all
but guaranteeing discordant discussions. Even more
fundamen-tally, the “balance” said to be achieved by
copyright—and disrupted by various changes thereto—
demands reconsidera-tion, particularly as it applies to
educational uses of copyright, including ever-troublesome
fair uses.33
1. “Rights”
Educators concerned with current alleged imbalances in
the state of copyright law—particularly the impacts of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act,34 the Sony Bono Copyright
Term Extension Act35 and the Copyright Damages
Improvement Act36—propose several means of resistance,
Timberg eds.,1980) (explaining the process of rewriting a book on popular
music in response to resistance from music publishers that functionally
disallowed use of lyrical clips in the work). See generally MARJORIE HEINS &
TRICIA BECKLES, WILL FAIR USE SURVIVE?: FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF COPYRIGHT CONTROL
26 (2005) (including several case studies of academics in different fields
frustrated with prohibitively expensive or complicated licensing
procedures).
33
. Fair uses are often described as “the most troublesome in the
whole law of copyright.” 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 145 (1976).
34
. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat.
2860 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 and 28 U.S.C.).
35
. Copyrights—Term Extension and Music Licensing Exemption, Pub. L.
No. 105-298, 11 Stat. 2827 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
17 U.S.C.), held constitutional by Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208
(2003).
36
. Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act,
Pub. L. No. 106-160, 113 Stat. 1774 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 17 and 28 U.S.C.).
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centered on rhetorical strategies designed to highlight the
public’s plight in copyright law.37 The Electronic Frontier
Foundation has taken a lead role in this rhetorical change.38
The resulting rhetoric of desert and “rights”—common in
activist circles39 but also in occasional court opinions40—
provides little promise of producing effective debate, when
used against the dominant, producer-based rhetoric of
copyright protection.41 It provides an insufficient bargaining
medium for owners and users by ignoring, rather than
seeking to address and reduce, the cost of educational use.42
37

. Professor Siva Vaidhyanathan explicitly rejects the rhetoric of
copyright as “property,” noting that educators “can’t win an argument as
long as those who hold inordinate interest in copyright maximization can
cry ‘theft’ at any mention of fair use or user’s rights.” Vaidhyanathan,
supra note 25. Instead, he advocates allegiance to one or both of two
recent rhetorical strategies designed to reorient copyright towards users,
rather than owners, interests: that of the information commons, or that
users’ “rights.” Id.
38
. See generally Electronic Frontier Foundation, Intellectual Property,
http://www.eff.org/IP/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2008).
39
. See, e.g., DigitalConsumer.org, Bill of Rights, http://www.Digital
consumer.org/bill.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2008) (providing that “users
have the right” to various activities—including time-shifting, space shifting,
and translation—in respect to legally acquired copies of copyrighted
works). The Electronic Frontier Foundation likewise speaks largely in of this
vocabulary of freedom and rights: “At the same time, IP must be carefully
limited to protect your rights to create, access, and distribute information,
as well as to develop new ways to do so.” See Electronic Frontier
Foundation, supra note 38.
40
. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Doc. Servs., 99 F.3d
1381, 1393 (6th Cir. 1996) (Martin, C.J., dissenting) (“The fair use doctrine,
which requires unlimited public access to published works in educational
settings, is one of the essential checks on the otherwise exclusive property
rights given to copyright holders . . . . [I]t is the essence of copyright and a
constitutional requirement.”); Harper & Row, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 604 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the holding
denying fair use to the Nation “effect[s a] curtailment in the free use of
knowledge and of ideas . . . risking the robust debate of public issues that
is the essence of self-government.”) (citation removed).
41
. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 450 (1984) (“The purpose of copyright is to create incentives for
creative effort.”); Addison-Wesley Publ’g Co. v. Brown, 223 F. Supp. 219,
228 (E.D.N.Y. 1963) (“Of preponderant importance to the Court in
evaluating the merits in doubtful cases . . . is the recognition by it of ‘the
economic philosophy behind the (constitutional) clause empowering
Congress to grant patents and copyrights.’ That philosophy persuades that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to
advance public welfare through the talents and authors and
inventors . . . .”) (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)).
42
. Paul Goldstein has divided the rhetorical camps of copyright—those
who support, and those who distrust, strong users’ rights as a method of

L. ASHLEY AULL, "THE COSTS OF PRIVILEGE: DEFINING PRICE
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 573-606 (2008).

IN THE

MARKET

FOR

EDUCATIONAL COPYRIGHT USE ," 9(2)

582

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
[Vol. 9:2
As a matter of doctrine, educational use is not a “right.”
Fair use, although championed as a “right” by some
activists, is more modestly conceived by most judges as a
“privilege”43 equivalent to an “exception to the [owner’s]
private property rights,”44 or simply “not an infringement.”45
Over-application of the privilege threatens the right of
copyright owners and, according to the dominant rhetoric for
copyright protection, ultimately hurts users by decreasing
the amount of copyrighted work that is produced.46 The
rhetoric of user rights, particularly where it cooperates with
the rhetoric of “freedom” to use copyrighted works,47
contributes to polarization of debates about proper copyright
protection.
While such polarization may invigorate
concerned citizens, it offers little promise of progress.

2. “Balance”
Canonically, scholars and judges alike describe copyright
as the codification of a “balance” between the interest of
authors in financial returns from their work and the interest
of the public in access to that work. Through a grant of
monopoly power to authors—that is, an almost-complete
right to exclude—the copyright law ultimately promotes user
access to art, literature and other original creations.
Exceptions for educational uses are considered an especially
important element of this “balance.” As stated in Williams &
Wilkins v. United States, “the development of fair use has
been influenced by . . . tension between the direct aim of the
achieving broad access to copyrighted works—into two camps: “optimists”
and “pessimists.” See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 15–17 (1994). These labels should indicate the degree to
which the camps are unable to make progress in discussions with one
another—few optimists can be reasoned into pessimism, and vice versa.
Id.
43
. Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir.
1966).
44
. Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1255 (2d Cir. 1986).
45
. Sony, 464 U.S. at 462 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
46
. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 557 (“Respondent’s theory . . .
would expand fair use to effectively destroy any expectation of copyright
protection in the work of a public figure. Absent such protection, there
would be little incentive to create or profit in financing such memoirs, and
the public would be denied an important source of significant historical
information.”).
47
. See Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 38 (“In each of these
instances and many more, your freedom runs up against intellectual
property.”).
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copyright privilege to grant the owner a right from which he
can reap financial benefit and the more fundamental
purpose of the protection ‘[t]o promote Progress of Science
and the useful Arts.’”48 The fair use doctrine, along with
explicit educational privileges, is said to “offer[] a means of
balancing the exclusive right of a copyright holder with the
public’s interest in dissemination of information affecting
areas of universal concern. . . .”49
Commentators worry
about whether the balance—at any given time—provides
more benefit to users or producers.50
Scholars and courts consider changes in technology and
user practices as variables that affect this balance. For
instance, the court in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco
stated that “the invention and widespread availability of
photocopying technology threatens to disrupt the delicate
balances established by the Copyright Act.”51 Likewise,
academic commentary surrounding recent legislative
amendments to the Copyright Act bemoans disruption of the
idealized balance embodied by the law.52 Many advocates
identify primarily with users of copyright and express intense
concern over the “tipping” of the copyright balance in favor
of owners, away from the interests of users.53 The copyright
balance thus teeters precariously between “free access” and
“individual control,” and appears a matter of esoteric policy:
metaphysical,54 impossible to optimize, and ever on the
48

. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1352 (Ct. Cl.
1973), aff’d, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
49
. Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977).
50
. See, e.g., Silberberg, supra note 15, at 620 (“Copyright law
balances the societal benefit of public access to information and ideas
against the need to provide creators with incentives to produce. As
copyright law has developed judicially, commentators have debated
whether the creator or the public should be the primary beneficiary of the
law.”).
51
. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 917 (2d Cir.
1994).
52
. See, e.g., Silberberg, supra note 15, at 620–621 (describing fair use
as an important element of the copyright balance, the contemporary
limitations on which have negatively affected the balance).
53
. See, e.g., Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 38 (“In the
move from analog to digital, offline to online, this delicate balance is
becoming dangerously tilted, as legislators, courts, and IP holders push for
ratcheting up IP rights. EFF fights to preserve balance and ensure that the
Internet and digital technologies continue to empower you as a consumer,
creator, innovator, scholar, and citizen.”).
54
. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (D. Mass. 1841)
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verge of tipping in one direction or another depending on the
actions of legislators, users, and producers.
The more one encounters articulations of this “balance”
and prophecies of its imminent disruption, the more it begins
to look like “price”: an actual value representing the point at
which producers’ and consumers’ interests meet, for a
moment, in an exchange. Other legal scholars recognize
that copyright law allows a market for otherwise “public”
goods,55 but do not push further to recharacterize the basic
“balance” at the foundation of American copyright law and
educational exceptions as the “price” resulting from that
market. However, characterized as “price,” the “balance”
achieved by copyright is neither esoteric nor unfamiliar to
the law or economics: it is the long-analyzed and recognized
playing ground on which producers and consumers of
products always meet.
Changes constitute not the
disruption of an ideal status, but the natural reactions to
changing supply and demand, changing costs of producing
copyrighted works, changing public interest in those works,
and the public’s changed ability to substitute other goods,
including pirated copies. Thus the advent of photocopying
technology conceived as a “threat” in Williams & Wilkins
resulted not in a harmful “disruption,” but in a natural price
adjustment.

C. THE COST

OF

“FREE” USE

The problem with this characterization of “balance” as
“price” is that it appears inimical to the basic presumption
that educational use ought to be (as a matter of rightness),
and appears to be (as a matter of copyright law), “free.”
Sections 107, 110(1) and 110(2) of the Copyright Act
explicitly make fair use and teaching exceptions “not

(“[C]opyrights approach nearer than any other class of cases belonging to
forensic distinctions, to what may be called the metaphysics of the law,
where the distinctions are, or at least may be very subtle and refined, and
sometimes, almost evanescent.”).
55
. The canonical article on the economics of copyright law, by Richard
Posner and William Landes, identifies the operation of the copyright laws as
providing legal barriers to access which allow for the alienability and
exchange of copyright products for adequate consideration, despite their
otherwise being a non-excludable and non-rivalrous “public good.” See
Richard Posner & William Landes, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law,
18 J. LEGAL. STUD. 325 (1989).
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infringements” of copyright.56 Thus, it would appear, at least
facially, that owners of copyright would have no rights
against fair users and teachers who would enjoy “free”
access to copyrighted works; as such, educational users
should be able to access such works without cost, and
content-owners should be prohibited from manipulating the
cost of—i.e., establishing a price for—access to their works.
Unfortunately for educators, however, the status of a use
as “not an infringement” under the law does not reduce the
cost of that use to zero—even for uses that result in no
economic damage whatsoever to the copyright owner.
Although educational privileges and fair use appear to
prohibit the establishment of a monetary “price” for access
to copyrighted works, the uncertain boundaries of these
privileges leave would-be educational users subject to a risk
of incurring economic damages if they do not seek the
permission of content-owners. Section 504 of the Copyright
Act, which provides for statutory damages of up to $150,000
per infringed work, creates an enormous potential cost for
any unlicensed use that does not to qualify for the protection
under §§ 107, 110(1) or 110(2).57 Even if determined in court
to be copyright infringements, many educational uses
produce nominal or no actual damages to the copyright
owner. However, the Copyright Act lets owners choose
statutory rather than actual damages as an award in the
event of infringement, and authorizes judges to award
whatever per-work value they consider “just.”58
The
traditional rationale for such greatly increased damages is
that actual damages may be hard to prove and that only the
promise of a statutory award will adequately induce owners
to invest in their copyrights.59 In any case, the availability of
such awards drastically changes the ex ante incentives of
would-be educational users—where there is even a low
probability of such high damages, the expected cost of an
unlicensed use of a copyrighted work is not zero.
Admittedly, courts tend to award low statutory damages
without evidence of profits lost by plaintiffs or reaped by
56

. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107, 110(1)–(2).
. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).
58
. See id.
59
. Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of
Damages Rules in Intellectual Property Law, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1585,
1651–52 (1998) (citing 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT 12.2, 12:34 (2d ed. 1996)).
57
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defendants.60 Even more significantly, statutory damages
have never been awarded against an individual teacher,61
not merely because such damages are statutorily
unavailable in many cases of reasonably presumed fair
use,62 but because plaintiffs apparently have not asked for
them. However, occasional awards of astronomical damages
in borderline-educational contexts inflate the expected cost
of infringement in the case of suit.63 Additionally, publishers
have shown considerable willingness to bring suit against
low-stakes infringers in order to increase the deterrent effect
of suit and encourage compliance with copyright law. For
instance, Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) regularly sues small
establishments for a small number of failures to obtain
licenses to play music.64 In these suits, BMI consistently asks
for statutory, rather than actual, damages.65 Thus, although
the chances of awarding astronom-ical damages against an
educator are very low, they cannot be discounted entirely.
Particularly with regard to fair use, insofar as the
doctrine is applied on a strictly “case by case” basis and is
resistant to generalization, every use by an educator
involves at least some risk of suit by a copyright owner. The
privilege is thus famously and “inordinately costly to
vindicate.”66 Though a defense to copyright infringement, it
60

. Id. at 1667–68.
. This assertion is based on a review of every reported case in which
statutory damages have been awarded.
62
. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).
63
. In Encyclopedia Britannica, for instance, awarding even the
minimum statutory damages—at the time $250 per infringed work—would
have resulted in damages of $93,000 against the public school system.
See Encyclopedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156,
1185 (W.D.N.Y. 1982). Likewise, after having their fair use defense
rejected, Kinko’s was ordered to pay $510,000 for just twelve
infringements. See Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F.
Supp. 1522, 1545 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
64
. See, e.g., Broad. Music v. DeGallo, 872 F. Supp. 167 (D. N.J. 1995)
(seven infringements).
65
. See id.
66
. Thomas F. Cotter, Accommodating the Unauthorized Use of
Copyrighted Works for Religious Purposes Under the Fair Use Doctrine and
Copyright Act § 110(3), 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 43, 44 (2004). Likewise,
systems for compliance with other aspects of copyright law are also
“cumbersome, expensive, and slow.”
Duane Webster, The Practical
Realities of the New Copyright Laws: A Librarian’s Perspective (Dec. 28,
2002) (transcript archived at http://web.archive.org/web/20060824053059/
http:// www.arl.org/info/frn/copy/webstermla02.html).
61
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is not a shield against all control of the copyright owner.67
Additionally, the privilege provided to educators under
§ 110(2)—a recently amended, highly qualified privilege for
the limited use of materials in distance education programs
—has not been tested by courts, and applies to online uses
to which copyright owners are particularly sensitive.
In short—there is always a risk of suit. It is not a
negligible risk. As one commentator has recognized:
“Educators, as guardians of a primary public interest,
enjoy . . . exceptions . . . which give them a comparatively
free, if somewhat uncertain, rein to use copyrighted
materials in their teaching activities.”68
Insofar this
commentator recognizes that the educators’ use is only
“comparatively” free—which means cheaper, but not free—
and dependent upon risk, she is correct. Statutory damages
almost always remain a possibility. As such, every educator’s
use of copyrighted works has an expected cost: the potential
cost—i.e., statutory damage award plus litigation cost—
multiplied by the probability of that cost being assessed.69
The content of the debate about educational use, then,
is primarily a debate about controlling the cost for that use:
§§ 107, 110(1) and 110(2) set limits on copyright-owners’
abilities to set prices for educational use of their works, but
they do not entirely eliminate the expected cost of
“privileged” educational use. The following section more
carefully discusses the “cost” of educational use, which
depends—for its existence—upon the Copyright Act’s grant
of monopoly control to authors,70 and depends—for its value
—upon varied, subtle aspects of the Copyright Act which
enforce a regime of price discrimination.71 The section will
67

. But see Silberberg, supra note 15, at 621 (“fair use acts as a shield
against the monopoly of copyright”).
68
. Maclean, supra note 2, at 666.
69
. See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory:
An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, ECONOMETRICA 263, 263–64 (1979)
(describing general calculation for the utility of a decision made under risk,
and noting the impact of risk aversion).
70
. See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 55, at 328 (theorizing
that because copyrighted material is a “public good,” absent a limited
monopoly, “the market price of the book will eventually be bid down to the
marginal cost of copying, with the unfortunate result that the book will
probably not be produced in the first place, because author and publishers
will not be able to recover their cost of creating the work.”).
71
. Cf. Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 55, 67 (2001) (“There are varied and subtle methods used
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first lay out the statutory mechanisms for this pricediscriminatory regime, and then will consider some of the
private actions of copyright owners that can manipulate the
expected cost of educational use within statutory
boundaries.

III. STATUTORY PRICE DISCRIMINATION: THE DEFINITION
AND SEPARATION OF AN EDUCATIONAL MARKET FOR
COPYRIGHTED WORK
Having abandoned conceptions of privileged educational
uses as “rights” to free access under the Copyright Act, we
can move forward to understand the means by which the Act
creates, segregates and protects a market for these uses. In
fact, the Copyright Act sets into motion an intricate pricediscriminatory regime that, exactly like more familiar private
price-discrimination mechanisms, uses proxies to determine
individuals’ ability to pay for copyrighted material and
cordons off those users in order to offer them different
prices.72
The price-discriminatory elements of producer-set prices
have been analyzed at length in several areas of copyright,
from the pricing of Broadway theater tickets to the
international coding of DVDs.73 Economists, in particular,
have devoted great attention to this area of copyright law,
identifying key features of copyright law that facilitate price
discrimination: the grant of limited monopoly power that
facilitates market power among content-producers and
restrictions on distribution that deter arbitrage.74 Such
analyses have assumed, however, that price discrimination
by price discriminators to block arbitrage and measure preferences.”).
72
. In order for a producer to price discriminate, three conditions must
be met: that producer must have (1) sufficient market power, (2) ability to
match prices to differing categories of customers’ ability to pay, and (3)
adequate methods for cordoning off separate markets of customers—with
separate prices—from one another. Meurer, supra note 71, at 59.
73
. See generally William R. Johnson, Creative Pricing in Markets for
Intellectual Property, 2 R. ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 39, 39–41 (describing
instances of price discrimination in the market for copyrighted works);
Meurer, supra note 71, at 59 n.5 (providing further examples).
74
. See Meurer, supra note 71, at 80–90 (noting that “most of the key
provisions of the law affect the profitability of price discrimination,” and
analyzing impacts on market power and arbitrage). See also Gordon, supra
note 17, at 1369 (“all intellectual property operates by fostering price
discrimination”).
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is the voluntary and sole choice of copyright producers75 and
that user privileges embodied in the Copyright Act generally
“impede” producers’ ability to discriminate.76 These analyses
have overlooked elements of the Copyright Act itself—
including provisions for user privileges—that mandate price
discrimination in the pricing of copyrighted works for
educational users.
The Copyright Act itself establishes a system of
decreased damages and privilege which lower the cost of
copyright for a small subset of users—namely, educational
users. At the same time, the Act demands limitations on
those uses in order to limit the impact of the use on outside
markets (limiting “arbitrage”). Statutory damage provisions,
the fair use defense generally, and the teaching exceptions
in § 110(1)–(2) embody the boundaries of these exclusive
markets. Courts engage in precise line-drawing between
markets—based on factors which correlate directly to a
perceived ability to pay—in a way well-recognized among
private actors for copyrighted works,77 but rarely ascribed to
75

. Meurer, supra note 71, at 91.
. Id. at 61 (“[B]road user rights impede price discrimination.
Compulsory licenses and fair use are two doctrines that contribute to broad
user rights and create obvious obstacles to price discrimination.”).
77
. Price discrimination by copyright owners is well-documented. See
generally Meurer, supra note 71 (presenting key examples of price
discrimination for copyrighted works and analyzing such practices’ effects
on the distribution of welfare). Among the most prevalent forms of such
discrimination is the “educational discount,” analogous to that provided
intrinsically by copyright law. Thus, for instance, Broadcast Music Inc.
(BMI) offers blanket licenses to colleges and universities for all music—
including concerts, student dining halls, etc.—at a rate significantly lower
than that required from commercial offices, concert-promoters or
restaurant owners.
See, e.g., License Agreement from BMI, BMI
College/University Music Performance Agreement (One Tier), available at
http://bmi.com/forms/ licensing/college58.pdf (providing for a per-student
fee of $0.31 per year); License Agreement from BMI, BMI Business Multiple
Use License, available at http://bmi.com/forms/licensing/multilic.pdf
(providing for a per-employee fee of up to $0.69 per year for the first 250
employees); License Agreement from BMI Music License for Eating &
Drinking
Establishments,
available
at
http://bmi.com/forms/licensing/ede.pdf (providing for a minimum peroccupant fee of $2.45 per year solely for playing of recorded music);
License Agreement from BMI Musical Attractions Music Performance
Agreement,
available
at
http://bmi.com/forms/licensing/musicalattractions.pdf (requiring payment
of fee equal to 0.30% of gross ticket revenues per attraction for arena with
up to 9999 seats). BMI additionally discriminates between for-profit and
not-for-profit performances of music. See id. (for a concert with 9999 in
76
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the government.
Likewise, arbitrage controls appear in other factors of
the fair-use analysis, and in the requirements under §
110(1)–(2) for various technological controls designed to
limit the leakage of educational-use copyright material into
other more profitable markets. Courts vigilantly patrol the
boundaries between the resulting educational and general
markets, and exhibit wariness to deem educational uses
privileged that would undermine the price-discriminatory
scheme.78

A. DEFINING

THE

EDUCATIONAL MARKET

The first element of this statutorily established regime of
price discrimination is its identification of different markets
attendance, BMI charges a total fee of only $125 if the concert is a nocharge benefit concert, but otherwise 0.30% of total ticket revenue for
concerts for which there is a charge). Software companies, likewise,
provide significant educational discounts—thus discriminating against
educational and non-educational users (as well as, frequently between
corporate and individual users). Such discounts may be based less on
altruism than on an assessment of educational users as having a lower
ability or willingness to pay than business users. See Hal R. Varian, Pricing
Information
Goods,
June
15,
1995,
http://www.sims.
berkeley.edu/~hal/Papers/price-info-goods.pdf; Meurer, supra note 71, at
70 n.51 (providing the example of Microsoft’s 1999 price list). One
wonders if the dearth of debate about educational fair use of software does
not result from the software companies having successfully priced their
goods below the expected cost of fair use. Textbooks provide a glaring
exception to the general rule—and college bookstores tend to charge much
higher prices for books than normal bookstores, no doubt because college
students must buy those books and thus have a higher valuation on them
than the average, flexible reader. Id. at 70 n.52 (college bookstores charge
more because “student customers of college bookstores have a fairly
inelastic demand for required course books”). See also Christos Cabolis et
al., A Textbook Example of International Price Discrimination, Sept., 2005,
http://www.econ.ucy.ac.cy/ papers/3-2005.pdf (outlining features of
general textbook market as well as hypothesizing that differing
international prices for identical products result from cross-cultural
differences on willingness to pay, resulting from differences in valuation of
education generally).
78
. Cf. William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1742, 1782 (1988) (“Accordingly, judges should watch
for situations in which unauthorized use of copyrighted material
undermines price discrimination schemes and should be chary of holding
such uses fair. . . . The more that privileging the activity would undermine
the ability of copyright owners to engage in price discrimination, the
weaker the case for fair use, because price discrimination both increases
the rewards available to creators (without increasing monopoly losses) and
equalizes consumers’ access to works of the intellect.”).

L. ASHLEY AULL, "THE COSTS OF PRIVILEGE: DEFINING PRICE
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 573-606 (2008).

IN THE

MARKET

FOR

EDUCATIONAL COPYRIGHT USE ," 9(2)

2008]

EDUCATIONAL COPYRIGHT USE
591
for copyrighted work. At first, the law purports to admit only
of one type of consumer and one type of producer: the bland
personalities “A” and “B” of law-school exams and formalist
analysis.
But in fact, copyright law recognizes several
different types of users: religious users,79 journalists and
commen-tators,80 public broadcasters,81 and educators.82 By
singling out these groups for reduced damages or special
privileges to use or perform works, the copyright law defines
markets in which copyright is necessarily—on average—less
expensive.83 Appropriate definitions of these markets ensure
that the appropriate parties qualify for the “discount,” and
ensure that reduced prices do not damage the marketability
of works in non-identified markets.
The kind of price discrimination functionally instituted by
the Copyright Act itself is third-degree price discrimination:
that which gauges a consumer’s ability to pay (and thus
adjusts the cost of access) by some immutable characteristic
of that consumer. Second-degree price discrimination—that
which depends upon particular behaviors to indicate
willingness to pay—also abounds in producer-side price
discrimination, but appears less common under the
Copyright Act, which prefers categorical line-drawing.84
Third-degree price discrimination requires the accurate
determination of relevant buyer characteristics which, as
closely as possible, track ability to pay.85
American
copyright law has visibly struggled to find these
characteristics over time.

1. “Nonprofit” Status under 1909 Law and Modern Fair Use
Under the provision of the 1909 Copyright Act,
equivalent to modern § 110(1), educators enjoyed the
benefits of a pure “not-for-profit” exception to copyrights in
79

. 17 U.S.C. § 110(3). See generally Cotter, supra note 66 (analyzing
recent fair use cases involving religious uses of copyrighted material and,
in some instances, affording them special treatment).
80
. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
81
. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
82
. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107, 110(1)–(2), 504(c).
83
. Because, as previously discussed, the law thus decreases the risk of
suit or magnitude of damages available against these parties, as compared
to the risk of suit for a general user.
84
. See generally Meurer, supra note 71, at 74–76 (comparing secondand third-degree price discrimination methods used by copyright owners).
85
. See id. at 75–76.
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the performance of musical and nondramatic literary
works.86
Pre-1976 law explicitly limited the owners’
performance rights in such works to performances that were
“in public” and “for profit,” thus granting broad use
privileges to performers not qualifying as either public or for
profit.87 Although educators urged the retention of that
exception during the 1976 revision process88—because it
provided a great and rather clear boon to them in their
activities—it presented obvious problems for the statutory
regime.
This “not-for-profit” exception has been eliminated under
current law because it failed to accurately identify a group’s
willingness or ability to pay. Large not-for-profit universities
were able to perform huge concerts without paying for
performance rights;. thus universities, although “nonprofit,”
had the financial resources to compete with major for-profit
institutions in their presentation of concerts and other live
musical events.89 The amendments made to the sections
redefine markets for copyrighted materials in order to better
capture profits therefrom.
Under the fair use analysis, the “not-for-profit” exception
persists in modified form, qualified in order to more
accurately test for the user’s ability to pay. The first factor
of fair use analysis under § 107 involves the assessment of
the “purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes.”90
The
distinction
between
“commercial” and “noncommercial” use, here, effectively
translates into a “for-profit” and “not-for-profit” inquiry,
favoring not-for-profit organizations and activities. While “a
finding of a nonprofit educational purpose does not
automatically compel a finding of fair use,”91 such finding
86

. 17 U.S.C. § 1(c), (e) (West 1970). See also Maclean, supra note 2,
at 666–67 (noting the “for profit” exception as one of two educational
exceptions to the monopoly right of copyright owners).
87
. 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (West 1975).
88
. See Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on S. 1006 Before the
Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 89th Cong, 1st Sess. (1965) (remarks of Dr. Harold
Wigren, representative of the Ad Hoc Committee of Educational Institutions
and Organizations).
89
. See id.
90
. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
91
. Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 1983).
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affords the defendant a presumption that his activity did not
economically harm the defendant92 and makes a finding of
fair use generally more likely. Commercial use is presumed
unfair.93
While the express words of the statute direct courts’
attention only to the character of the use, the character of
the user often plays into this factor as well. As stated by the
Second Circuit in Texaco: “Though [the defendant] properly
contends that the court’s focus should be on the use of the
copyrighted material and not simply on the user, it is overly
simplistic to suggest that the purpose and character of the
use can be fully discerned without considering the nature
and objectives of the user.”94 Some judges go further,
arguing that the status of the user should be all-butdeterminative of the fairness of their use—so much so that a
use, even if for profit, should be presumptively fair if the
user is a researcher.95
Attention to status becomes
particularly acute in the instance of non-profit uses by
educators, whose identity and activity is unified to the
extent that courts interpret § 107’s preference for
“teaching, . . . scholarship, or research”96 to afford teachers,
scholars and researchers a presumption of privilege under
fair use.97 Thus, although courts emphasize that it is the
character of the “use” primarily at issue under § 107, the
status or identity of the would-be infringer plays a significant
role in considerations of this factor. For instance, research
for a non-profit company gets drastically different treatment
92

. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
451 (1984) (“[I]f the intended use is commercial gain, that likelihood [of
future economic harm] may be presumed. But if it is for a noncommercial
purpose, the likelihood must be demonstrated.”).
93
. See id. at 451 (“commercial use of copyrighted material is
presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs
to the owner of the copyright”).
94
. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 922 (2d Cir.
1994).
95
. See, e.g., Texaco, 60 F.3d at 932 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (“The
photocopying was . . . integral to ongoing research by a scientist. In my
view, all of the statutory factors organize themselves around this fact.”).
96
. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
97
. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 477 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“There are
situations . . . in which strict enforcement of [the copyright] monopoly
would inhibit the very ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts’ that copyright is
intended to promote. An obvious example is the researcher or scholar
whose own work depends on the ability to refer to and quote the work of
prior scholars.”).
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than research for a for-profit company, with the latter
receiving considerably less leeway.98

2. Statutory Damages
Statutory damages play an additional key role in defining
the boundaries of the educational market under copyright
law.
The statute itself provides for a sliding scale of
damages from the nominal ($200 per infringed work) to the
crippling ($150,000 per infringed work), with educational
users specifically singled out for the possibility of zero
damages in the event of an incorrect but good-faith reliance
upon fair use. However, this zero-bracket for damages
explicitly requires that the defendant be a member of a
defined market. Namely, in order for statutory damages to
be remitted altogether, the infringer must be:
(i) an employee or agent of a nonprofit educational institution,
library, or archives acting within the scope of his or her
employment who, or such institution, library, or archives itself,
which infringed by reproducing the work in copies or phonorecords;
or
(ii) a public broadcasting entity which or a person who, as a regular
part of the nonprofit activities of a public broadcasting entity . . .
infringed by performing a published nondramatic literary work or
by reproducing a transmission program embodying a performance
of such a work.99

The most significant limitation—and thus the most
significant
“market”
definition—imbedded
in
this
qualification is that the institution be non-profit and, in the
case of educators or librarians under subsection (i), that they
have “reproduced” the work in copies or phonorecords. As
such, the expected value of the copyright use is higher for a
range of for-profit institutions and a range of conduct not
considered reproduction.
B. ARBITRAGE CONTROLS: STATUTORY DEFINITION
SEPARATE MARKETS FOR COPYRIGHTED WORKS

AND

MAINTENANCE

OF

In concert, the provisions of statutory damages and fair
use define the boundaries of the market in which there is the
lowest expected cost of copyright production for a user: the
market in which a member of a favored class of “educators”
or “researchers” engages in nonprofit activity, for a nonprofit
98
99

. See, e.g., Texaco, 37 F.3d at 899.
. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
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institution.
The statutory regime keeps the nonprofit
educational market stable and containable enough to be
afforded a discount on copyrighted works without risking
arbitrage into the “normal” market. It maintains a group of
discount users discrete enough that their existence does not
“impair[] the copyright holder’s ability to demand
compensation from (or deny access to) any group who would
otherwise be willing to pay. . . .”100
As such, statutory
regimes governing—and courts analyzing—educational uses
exhibit as much concern for the permeability of the
boundary between the educational and normal markets as
for that boundary’s location.
In order to avoid arbitrage—the “leakage” of low prices
across the boundary from the educational to the general
market—copyright law incorporates a series of explicit
requirements, weighing analyses and other provisions that
only allow educators to obtain lower-cost uses when they
have engaged in an activity that does not pose an
unreasonable risk of “leaking” low prices into the general
market. These arbitrage controls appear explicitly in § 110,
and more subtly in the fair use analysis under § 107.101

1. Educational Privileges Under Sections 110(1) and 110(2)
Arbitrage controls are most explicit in the context of the
§ 110(1) and § 110(2) teaching exceptions, which—
particularly since revisions in 2002 under the TEACH Act—
require physical or technological quarantining of works used
for educational purposes, to avoid their leaking into other
markets and thereby decreasing non-educational demand.102
These sections provide that, notwithstanding the rights
granted to copyright-holders by § 106 of the Copyright Act,
“the following are not infringe-ments to copyright”:
(1) performance or display of a work by instructors or pupils in the
course of face-to-face teaching activities of a nonprofit educational
institution, in a classroom or similar place devoted to
instruction . . . ; [and]
(2) . . . the performance of a nondramatic literary or musical work
or reasonable limited portions of any other work, or display of a
work in an amount comparable to that which is typically displayed
100

. Sony, 464 U.S. at 485 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107, 110(1)–(2).
102
. Technology, Education, and Copyright Harmonization Act of 2002
[hereinafter TEACH Act], Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1910 (codified as
amended in scattered section of 17 U.S.C.).
101
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in the course of a live classroom session, by or in the course of a
transmission . . . .103

Both of these exceptions are, themselves, subject to
significant qualifying conditions. Section 110(2) in particular
articulates a series of highly-specific requirements for an
insti-tution and a particular use to qualify as a noninfringement: the performance or display must be made by
or under the supervision of an instructor; it must be an
integral part of a class session; it must be directly related
and of material assistance to instruction; it must be made
solely for and be limited to students officially enrolled in the
course; and the transmitting institution must have instituted
strict access-controls and copyright policies.104
These sections, in fact, constitute arbitrage controls for
the educational-use market. Section 110(1) requires the
ultimate in arbitrage control—physical encapsulation. That
section privileges educational performance or display of a
work only if such performance or display takes place “in the
course of face-to-face teaching activities of a nonprofit
educational institution, in a classroom or similar place
devoted to instruction.”105
Particularly in light of the
limitations read into this section by its sister-section 110(2),
“similar place devoted to instruction” does not admit much
expansion—certainly, not to any form of broadcast.
As originally enacted in 1976, § 110(2) was considered
sufficient—in concert with § 110(1)—to “cover all of the
various methods by which performances or displays in the
course of systematic instruction take place.”106 Up until its
2002 revision, however, § 110(2) was limited to educational
performances of nondramatic literary or musical works or
displays of a work if the transmission was received in a
classroom, displays to persons necessarily in other places
due to disability or other special circumstances, and displays
to officers of the government.107 This limitation provided
ample comfort to copyright owners, who could be assured
that the teaching exception could not result in broadcast
beyond closed-circuit television. However, the provision
significantly hampered the development of online distance
103
104
105
106
107

.
.
.
.
.

17 U.S.C. § 110(1)–(2).
Id. § 110(2)(A)–(D).
Id. § 110(1) (emphasis added).
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 81 (1976).
17 U.S.C. § 110(2) (West 1976).
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education programs, which—by not enjoying the benefits of §
110(1) or § 110(2)—paid significantly higher costs for use of
teaching materials.108
After a long process of public
comment and consideration, Congress significantly altered §
110(2) to accommodate those online distance-education
practices.109
The modified § 110(2) responded significantly to fears of
copyright owners that allowance of certain performances
and displays over the internet—even in the context of
educational use—would lead to broader damage to their
markets because of the ease of digital piracy and
inadequacy of most digital-rights management systems.110
The provision thus includes an explicit arbitrage control that
requires institutions to take adequate technological
precautions against downstream piracy.111 In particular, §
110(2)(D) requires the institution in which a particular
teacher works to “institute[] policies regarding copyright”
and “apply technological measures that reasonably
prevent . . . unauthorized further dissemination of the work
in accessible form by . . . recipients to others.”112 The law
thus requires that teachers covered by the section avoid
creation of unreasonable risk of down-stream piracy
following their educational use. A use is not privileged
whatsoever under § 110(2) if it poses such an unreasonable
108

. See generally Laura N. Gasaway, Distance Learning and Copyright:
An Update, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 195, 200 (2001) (“The current
Copyright Act recognizes the unique position and importance of education
by providing crucial exemptions to the exclusive rights of the copyright
holder. Unlike the exemption for face-to-face teaching, however,
instructional transmission (i.e., distance education) is not so favored.”).
109
. See TEACH Act, supra note 102.
110
. The dangers of piracy and the inadequacy of protections dominated
the publisher-side comments about proposed amendments to the act. See,
e.g., Comments from the American Society of Journalists and Authors to the
United States Copyright Office, Office of Policy and International Affairs
(Feb.
4,
1999),
available
at
http://www.copyright.gov/disted/comments/init007.pdf; Comments from
the Motion Picture Association of America to the United States Copyright
Office, Office of Policy and International Affairs (Feb. 5, 1999), available at
http://copyright.gov/disted/comments/init022.pdf (“greater protections are
necessary to stimulate the production and dissemination of works
necessary to carry out effective distance education activities”); Comments
from the Recording Industry Association of America to the United States
Copyright Office, Office of Policy and International Affairs (Feb. 5, 1999),
available at http://www.copyright.gov/disted/comments/init023.pdf.
111
. See Hutchinson, supra note 32, at 2222.
112
. 17 U.S.C. §§ 110(2)(D)(i)–(ii)(I)(bb).
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risk. This provision of the law thus reinforces the barrier
between the “educational” market and the “general
market,” and imposes technological arbitrage controls to
prevent leakage from one market into another.113

2. Fair Use
Fair use imposes further arbitrage controls, particularly
under the fourth factor analyzed by courts under § 107: “the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.”114 As interpreted by Justice Blackmun
in Sony, in order to successfully plead fair use, “the infringer
must demonstrate that he had not impaired the copyright
holder’s ability to demand compensation from (or to deny
access to) any group who would otherwise be willing to pay
to see or hear the copyrighted work.”115
Analysis of this factor in the fair-use analysis is as old as
the doctrine itself—referenced, even, in the “first”
articulation of the fair use doctrine in Folsom v. Marsh:
[W]e must often, in deciding questions of this sort, look to the
nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value
of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may
prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects,
of the original work.116

Although the Supreme Court has disavowed its oncearticulated view that this is the most important factor
considered in the fair-use analysis,117 lower courts certainly
continue to give this factor special weight.118
Many criticisms of fair use point out that this “definitionof-the-market” test is circular, insofar as in some sense
113

. Viewed in this context, copyright owners’ particular resistance to
extensions of fair use on the internet, and litigiousness in that area, may be
viewed as recognition that arbitrage controls appear—at least as of yet—
weaker in the internet sphere. It is difficult to assure copyright owners of
the non-market-impacting use of a particular work where the medium of its
usage is notorious for leakage.
114
. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
115
. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 485
(1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
116
. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (D. Mass. 1841) (emphasis
added).
117
. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 594 (1994);
Harper & Row, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985).
118
. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Doc. Servs., 99 F.3d
1381, 1387–89 (6th Cir. 1996); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60
F.3d 913, 921 (2d Cir. 1994).
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every instance of fair use will result in harm to the plaintiff’s
market—plaintiff will lose its right to refuse access or charge
at least one licensing fee to the defendant at issue.119 This
test functions coherently, however, if the world of users is
divided into two markets, and the factor works to patrol the
boundary between those markets. As stated by the majority
of the Supreme Court in Harper & Row: fair use is
unavailable if, “should [the challenged use] become
widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market
for the copyrighted work.”120 The Court, in such passages,
functionally separates the market for copyright into two
distinct markets—one in which the copyright holder has no
right to exclude and may not directly charge for access to
his works (the fair-use market) and the other in which all of
the rights under the copyright act apply (the general or
“potential” market).121 Courts thus determine every instance
of fair use by reference to its impact on the permeability of
the line between the fair-use market and the general
market, attempting to avoid “major inroads” from one
market into the other.122 If, all other factors weighing in
favor of the fair user, a finding of fair use would harm the
119

. See Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1407 (Ryan, C.J., dissenting)
(“the majority’s logic would always yield a conclusion that the market had
been harmed because any fees that a copyright holder could extract from
a user if the use were found to be unfair would be ‘lost’ if the use were
instead found to be ‘fair use.’”); see also Fisher, supra note 78, at 1671
(“[I]n almost every case in which the fair use doctrine is invoked, there will
be some material adverse impact on a ‘potential market’ as . . . the
Court . . . define[s] the phrase . . . . To permit the defendant to engage in
the activity for free prevents the plaintiff from exacting a fee from the
defendant. Thus, in all but the rare cases in which the defendant for some
reason would be unwilling to pay the plaintiff anything, a finding that the
defendant’s conduct is ‘fair’ will ‘impair the marketability of the work.’”);
Pierre N. Leval, Towards a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1124
(1990) (“By definition every fair use involves some loss of royalty . . . .”).
See also Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1357 n.19
(Ct. Cl. 1973), aff’d, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (“It is wrong to measure the
detriment to plaintiff by loss of presumed royalty income—a standard
which necessarily assumes that plaintiff had a right to issue licenses. . . .
In determining whether the company has been sufficiently hurt to cause
these practices to become “unfair,” one cannot assume at the start the
merit of the plaintiff’s position, i.e., that plaintiff had the right to license.”).
120
. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568 (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 451)
(emphasis added).
121
. “In the economists’ view, permitting ‘fair use’ to displace normal
copyright channels disrupts the copyright market without a commensurate
public benefit.” Id. at 566 n.9.
122
. Sony, 464 U.S. at 481 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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border between the fair use and general market—thus
permitting significant arbitrage and detracting from the
value of the copyright within the general market—it may not
be deemed fair.
Concern for the clear division of the educational market
from the general market explains the apparent de facto
exclusion of some entire genres from fair use—genres in
which the general market is the educational market. For
example, secure tests—such as the SAT or LSAT—do not
permit fair use; in fact, Congress specifically stated an
intention, upon codification of § 107, not to “reduce the
protection for secure tests, the utility of which is especially
vulnerable to unauthorized disclosure.”123 Similarly, fair use
is unlikely to apply to classroom copies made of textbooks
and other materials produced specifically for classroom use,
since such copies represent non-permissive use of materials
in their “general” market.124 Additionally, biographers seem
partic-ularly susceptible to findings of infringement for use of
the letters of their subjects, particularly where the heirs of
said subject express interest in publication of those letters
themselves.125 And the Supreme Court has explicitly stated
that first publication rights—in that “only one person” can
exercise them—are less likely to permit fair uses. 126 The
weakness of fair use in these contexts is consistent with a
view of the doctrine as attempting to define a strict
boundary
between
multiple
markets:
general
and
educational. Claims of fair use, for uses within the general
market pose a great risk of destroying a principled division
between markets, and are thus rejected.
Uses which
supplant “any part of the normal market” are
infringements.127
123

. Educ. Testing Servs. v. Simon, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090 (C.D. Cal.
1999).
124
. “With respect to the fair use doctrine, ‘[t]extbooks and other
material prepared primarily for the school market would be less susceptible
to reproduction for classroom use than material prepared for general public
distribution.’” Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing
H.R. REP. NO. 90-83, at 34 (1967)). Such materials also are also explicitly
excluded from the exceptions granted for distance education under §
110(2). 17 U.S.C. § 110(2).
125
. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 11.
126
. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 553.
127
. H.R. REP. NO. 90-83, at 34 (1967). Thus, in finding fair use in Wright,
the court was required to emphasize that the defendant’s biography “does
not pose a significant threat to the potential market for Wright’s letters or
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The fair use analysis, so considered, not only recognizes
but actively defends the separation of two distinct markets
for copyrighted works, and—on a case by case basis—
determines the boundaries of the fair-use market so as to
maintain its distinctiveness from the general market.128
Case-by-case findings of fair use which would tend towards
significant intrusion upon the general market are rejected.129
All other factors being equal,130 more insular uses are more
likely to be found fair, and thus come at a significantly lower
expected cost for educational users.

IV. OTHER INFLUENCES ON THE PRICE OF EDUCATIONAL USE
While the Copyright Act—both in form and in function—
defines a separate and lower-cost market for educational
use, the lack of quantified clarity in the law allows for
additional, non-statutory, factors to affect the price of
educational use. As this section will discuss, in addition to
statutory influences on price—quantifiable factors which
define damages and delineate immunities from copyright
infringement—two additional factors influence the ultimate
“price” of educational use. First, lack of certainty about the
boundaries of fair use and other privileges impacts the real
and perceived price of use.
Second, the enforcement
strategies of copyright owners themselves impact prices—
both by manipulating uncertainty and by changing the
chance of suit against particular groups of users.
Commentators have recognized these factors but not

journals . . . . Impairment of the market for these works is unlikely.”
Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 739 (2d Cir. 1991).
128
. The Guidelines to Educational Copyright provide further insight into
the arbitrage controls which are built into the copyright law through fair
use provisions.
One commentator explicitly noted that the
“temporariness” factor read into fair use by the House Report appears to
be intended to prevent circulation of copies beyond members of the class—
itself a “reasonable limitation to prevent encroachment on the copyright
owner’s market.” See MacLean, supra note 2, at 671 (citing H.R. REP. NO.
90–83, at 29–37 (1967)). MacLean suggests that the requirement might be
fulfilled by “systematic recall” of all distributed copies at the end of a
semester or year.
129
. See, e.g., Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 552.
130
. Though, in particular, the quantity of copying may also work
towards the same goal of assessing the insularity of an expected fair use:
the more of a work that is copied, or the more copies that are created, the
more likely is free access to the work by general market customers.

L. ASHLEY AULL, "THE COSTS OF PRIVILEGE: DEFINING PRICE
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 573-606 (2008).

IN THE

MARKET

FOR

EDUCATIONAL COPYRIGHT USE ," 9(2)

602

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
[Vol. 9:2
grappled with them as price-setting techniques,131 which
have successfully increased risk-averse behavior on the part
of educators132 and made licenses cheaper than reliance
upon statutory privileges.

A. MANIPULATION

OF

UNCERTAINTY UNDER

AN

UNCLEAR LEGAL STANDARD

Various elements of educational privileges under
copyright law make the position of teachers and other
educators uncertain. Typically, educators decry the case-bycase and weighing analysis under fair use, a doctrine that
“many find unpredictable, if not incomprehensible.”133
During the process leading up to the enactment of the 1976
Act, and once since, educators and copyright owners
unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate binding, bright-line
rules governing fair use.134 These attempts failed; even the
Guidelines for Classroom Copying incorporated into the
statutory history of fair use note that copyright beyond the
defined bright-line area may or may not be fair use.135 The
131

. See, e.g., Webster, supra note 66 (“Where uncertainty about
permissible use exists, liability concerns may lead librarians to forego uses
that are actually permitted under the copyright law.”).
132
. Consider, for instance, the number of educational institutions which
have adopted strict, bright-line “fair use” policies much more conservative
than the statutory grant of immunity following a suit by publishers against
New York University. See 1983-1984 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) P25, 544
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (stipulated order and final judgment pursuant to settlement
agreement between Addison-Wesley Publishing, et al., and New York
University). The NYU settlement, though unpublished, is partially reprinted
in Eric D. Brandfonbrener, Fair Use and University Photocopying: AddisonWesley Publishing v. New York University, 19 U. MICH. J. LEGAL REF. 669
(1986).
133
. Naomie Abe Voegtli, Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOK L. REV.
1213, 1266 (1997).
Its case-sensitivity is so profound that one
commentator has called “counterfactual” the assumption that a
knowledgeable actor could determine in advance whether his behavior
constituted fair use. Rubenfeld, supra note 16, at 17.
134
. See generally Crews, supra note 18, at 608–11.
135
. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 68 (“The parties agree that the conditions
determining the extent of permissible copying for educational purposes
may change in the future; that certain types of copying permitted under
these guidelines may not be permissible in the future; and conversely that
in the future other types of copying not permitted under these guidelines
may be permissible under revised guidelines. Moreover, the following
statement of guidelines is not intended to limit the types of copying
permitted under the standards of fair use under judicial decision and which
are stated in Section 107 of the Copyright Revision Bill. There may be
instances in which copying which does not fall within the guidelines stated
below may nonetheless be permitted under the criteria of fair use.”).
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Supreme Court has emphasized that “fair use analysis must
always be tailored to the individual case.”136
Depending on the magnitude and the context of such
uncertainty concerning legal rules, affected parties may
either over- or under-comply with the stated rule—they may
either become more risk-averse than warranted (relying less
upon fair use) or less risk-averse than warranted (relying
excessively upon fair use). As stated by Professors Richard
Craswell and John Calfee:137
Real enforcement institutions always involve some degree of
uncertainty and . . . that uncertainty can change the incentives
created by the legal rules in unexpected ways. In some cases, it
can lead to more deterrence than would be socially optimal; in
other cases, it can lead to far less.138

According to Craswell and Calfee, overcompliance with a
particular law is likely to be common—even for risk-neutral
parties—if the uncertainty is “relatively small”; conversely,
broad
uncertainty
is
more
likely
to
lead
to
undercompliance.139 Ultimately, there is no way to tell which
of these two effects will dominate: but anecdotal evidence
may provide support for a given hypothesis.140
Within different segments of the educational-use
community, both under- and over-compliance appear
common.
Many educational users who publish on the
subject either explicitly recognize or exhibit under-reliance
upon fair use in the educational community. Institutional
users, for instance, have wedded themselves to extremely
conservative internal fair use policies;141 individuals,
expressing anxiety about their lack of knowledge of the
scope of possible liabilities, simply fail to rely upon fair use
or other privileges.142 Simultaneously, many teachers and
educators simply assume that what they do must be legal—
and, as such, perhaps tread too far into the area of
unprotected activities under an assumption that because of
the nonprofit, educational nature of their activities they are
136

. Harper & Row, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552 (1985).
. Professor of Economics at the University of Southern California and
representative of the Federal Trade Commission.
138
. Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal
Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279, 299 (1986).
139
. Id. at 280.
140
. Id. at 282.
141
. See, e.g., Brandfonbrener, supra note 132, at 669.
142
. See, e.g., Belz, supra note 32, at 38; Webster, supra note 66.
137
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B. ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY
This uncertainty about educational privilege, however,
has a Heisenbergian quality—although at a given moment it
may be impossible to tell whether over- or under-reliance on
fair use dominates the academic community, one can easily
tell what kinds of behavior increase or decrease an
educator’s tolerance for risk. In particular, publishers and
other owners’ actions can impact the price of educational
use.
Namely, publishers might purposefully decrease
uncertainty about a particular legal rule in order to increase
risk-averse behavior on the part of educators. An intelligent
and strategic publisher would thus seek to manipulate the
variables of Craswell and Calfee’s uncertainty equation—
namely, adjusting the likelihood of being caught and the size
of possible damages—in order to encourage large-scale
under-reliance upon fair use.144 Thus, both producers and
consumers can predict the kinds of behavior that producers
can take to decrease reliance upon fair use and other
privileges.
Under the rubric provided in the Calfee article, the size
of uncertainty can be measured as the proportionality of
enforcement-to-violation of a rule.145 “Large” uncertainty is
that in which one’s level of, say, copyright infringement has
no effect on the likelihood of being caught—a situation
perhaps akin to that of many users of Napster and online
143

. Hutchinson, supra note 32, at 2231–32 (“The majority of educators
are unaware of the intricacies of copyright law. . . . [They] largely do not
follow the latest developments in copyright law.”).
144
. Note that the fair use factors themselves admit to alteration
through enforcement strategies. Because the fourth factor under § 107
looks to the economic impact of a particular use, the mere existence of a
market price may decrease the likelihood of a finding of fair use, insofar as
some quantifiable market damage (as a loss of licensing fee) can always be
shown so long as such a fee exists ex ante. See Fisher, supra note 78, at
1671.
145
. See Craswell & Calfee, supra note 138, at 286 (“Since the effect of
x [defendant’s violation-level] on the likelihood of being punished was the
only factor creating an incentive to overcomply, the incentive to
overcomply becomes weaker as this factor becomes smaller. The extreme
case, where shifts in the defendant’s level of x have no effect on the
chance of punishment (so that only the incentive to undercomply is left) is
precisely the situation modeled by traditional deterrence theorists who
concluded that uncertainty about enforcement would always produce
undercompliance.”).
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downloading services. In a regime in which all violations of
the rule are detected and enforced, there is no uncertainty.
Thus, to “decrease” uncertainty is to increase the degree to
which large-scale violators are punished more often than
small-scale
violators:
to
attempt
to
perfect
the
proportionality of enforcement to violation.
In the
educational context, this would appear as visible, occasional
suits brought against individual teachers; increasingly more
common suits against teachers who used relatively more
copyrighted material; and extremely common suits against
large institutional copiers.
The actual enforcement policies of owners against
educational users do not (yet) exhibit such a tidy pattern.
Owners undoubtedly disfavor suits against individual
educators and in educational contexts, and thus have mostly
brought suit against large institutional copiers while
neglecting smaller players.146 This enforcement strategy has
the overall effect of reducing the “cost” of copyright use—
even infringing use—to educational users, because it creates
relatively large uncertainty about whether they will ever, at
all, be sued.
If enforcement were such that individual educators were
never sued, then in fact their privileges would be free. It is
not completely unheard-of that producers would choose this
course of action: in other contexts, theorists have suggested
that copyright owners purposefully fail to bring suit against a
particular class of infringers, in order to undercut
competitors without offending antitrust statutes147 and to
maintain market power by encouraging dependency on their
products (particularly software) by non-business users.148
Nevertheless, the import of this analysis is in showing
that the price of educational privilege remains volatile and
easily influenced by the behaviors of copyright owners. The
uncertainty inherent in the legal standards governing
146

. Only three reported cases indicate suits brought directly against
non-profit educators. See Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1172 (9th Cir.
1983); Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777, 778–79 (8th Cir. 1962); MacMillan Co.
v. King, 223 F. 862, 867–68 (D. Mass. 1914).
147
. See Danny Ben-Shahar & Assaf Jacob, Selective Enforcement of
Copyright as an Optimal Monopolistic Behavior, 3 CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECON. ANAL.
& POL’Y 1118 (2004); see also Giovanni B. Ramello, Copyright and Antitrust
Issues, 114 LUC PAPERS–SERIE ECONOMIA IMPRESA 1 (2002) (noting that copyright
enforcement can also be used as an anticompetitive strategy).
148
. Ramello, supra note 147, at 9–10.
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educational use—the kind of uncertainty recognized and
often decried by unhappy educational users—allows for the
enforcement strategies of particular firms to greatly increase
or decrease the cost of educational uses. Thus, although the
Copyright Act does considerable work in separating and
defining an educational market of reduced-cost access to
copyrighted works, it leaves ample room for owners to
influence price: raising or lowering perceived cost through
the engineering of uncertainty, and affecting actual cost by
changing enforcement strategies across markets.

V. CONCLUSION
By redirecting analytical focus towards a monetized
conception of educational use—focusing on the factors and
behaviors capable of increasing and decreasing the
expected cost of use—this paper has attempted to offer
better ground for negotiations between educators and
copyright owners and better bases for criticism of the
current statutory regime.
Translation of common
educational copyright debates into terms regarding price,
along with the statutory and practical factors impacting that
price, grounds what is often a passionate, unproductive
debate. Providing a realistic articu-lation of the “balance” so
often sought by commentators should provide a better
means of assessing Congress’ success in achieving a
balance—a price—that provides compensation necessary to
copyright owners without pricing-out users whose access
would provide net benefits to society. Furthermore, by
analyzing structural components of the educational market
that are defined by copyright law, this paper draws attention
away from the sometimes demonic conceptions of copyright
owners to reveal the areas of law that have allowed, if not
promoted, owners’ strategic behavior.
Prices for educational uses already exist, and thus
should not be rejected as debased monetization of a “free”
privilege; the bargaining power of both sides in educational
debates suffers from the parties’ inability to bargain
explicitly about costs. Fair use has a price. Educational
privilege has a price. By making that price more explicit—at
least in commentary, if not in the law—educators and
copyright owners will posses a better vocabulary with which
to bargain over the “balance” that optimizes their interests.

